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CAN PROSECUTORS BLUFF?
BRADY V. MARYLAND AND PLEA
BARGAINING
John G. Douglasst
"[A prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
''l
ones.
INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE QUESTION
Poker players can bluff. But what about prosecutors? Does the law
allow a prosecutor to strike a deal for a guilty plea without telling all
she knows about her witnesses? Can she sign the plea agreement and
still keep to herself the criminal records, the sweetheart deals, the
contradictory statements that make some of her witnesses seem like
jokers rather than aces, kings or queens? Does our poker-faced
prosecutor strike a "hard blow" against crime in a tough case by
convincing defendant to acknowledge his guilt and accept the
consequences? Or is her blow a "foul one," cheating defendant of any
fair chance to make an informed decision about his own liberty?
To explore those questions, we might start by considering what a
rule requiring disclosure in plea negotiations could accomplish. We
already have some helpful answers. In today's conference and in
earlier articles, Professor McMunigal argues that Brady-like
disclosure during plea bargaining helps to protect innocent people
t Professor of Law, University of Richmond.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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from being coerced into pleading guilty.2 I believe his argument is
both correct and immensely important to anyone concerned about
justice in our system.
Professor McMunigal and my University of Richmond colleague
Corinna Lain also have demonstrated how Brady-like disclosure in
plea negotiation enhances the "accuracy" of plea bargaining.3 In other
words, disclosure helps to prevent innocent people from pleading
guilty more than it deters guilty pleas by factually guilty defendants.4
So, in a system with broader pre-plea disclosure, a guilty plea is more
reliably a true measure of factual guilt.
In large measure, I agree with those arguments as well. As a
general rule, lawyers in any kind of litigation-civil or criminal-
settle cases in part based on an assessment of the risks and benefits of
going to trial. Full disclosure promotes more accurate assessments on
both sides and produces bargains that more accurately mirror the
likely outcome of a trial.5 Moreover, as a general rule, nondisclosure
disproportionately harms the innocent since, almost 6 by definition,
guilty defendants know more about the facts surrounding a crime than
do those who are factually innocent. Finally, nondisclosure can cause
special disadvantages for a population of defendants who are most
vulnerable to coercion in the plea bargaining process. Youth, mental
infirmities, drug or alcohol abuse may limit the ability of some
defendants to understand or recall events that have led to criminal
charges.7 Those defendants more readily may be persuaded of their
2 See generally Kevin McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1989).
3 Id. at 985-97; Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in
the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 29-37 (2002) (suggesting that disclosure
under Brady is essential).
4 At the risk of gross oversimplification, the argument goes something like this.
Disclosure of exculpatory evidence helps defendant accurately assess the odds of conviction at
trial and thereby helps him to avoid "overvaluing" the benefit of a plea agreement. McMunigal,
supra note 2, at 998-99; Lain, supra note 3, at 29-30. Hence, Brady-like disclosure will deter
some guilty pleas. And, the argument goes, that will benefit the innocent more often than the
guilty because, by definition, cases with significant exculpatory evidence are more likely to
involve innocents. McMunigal, supra note 2, at 991. As Professor McMunigal further points
out, a system which requires Brady disclosure for trials but not for guilty pleas would tend to
encourage prosecutors to "divert Brady cases into plea bargaining." Id. at 997 (increasing the
chances of guilty pleas in the weakest cases).
5 See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction: The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 449-50 (2001) [hereinafter Fatal Attraction] (noting that plea
bargains resolve a majority of criminal cases).
6 I say "almost" because, as Professor McMunigal has argued, some elements of some
crimes may be beyond the knowledge of any defendant, whether guilty or not. McMunigal,
supra note 2, at 971-80.
7 Id. at 981-82 (discussing difficulty of some defendants to answer questions about their
conduct).
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"guilt." 8 And they may be least able to assist their own counsel in
finding defenses. In those cases, disclosure by the prosecutor can
raise questions for defense counsel where an uncomprehending client
may not. In sum, the protection of innocence, even in the context of a
guilty plea, is a sound and sufficient reason to consider rules that
would promote disclosure in plea bargaining.
But is Brady v. Marylanct the right rule? Is it a rule that the Due
Process Clause extends to plea bargaining as well as to trial? And, if
so, is it a rule that defendant and prosecutor can never agree to waive
in that same plea bargain? Those are the questions that were before
the Court in United States v. Ruiz.'0 I write here to explain why I feel
the unanimous Court answered them correctly, despite my view that
more disclosure in plea bargaining would be a good thing.
The Ninth Circuit in Ruiz, like several other courts before it,11
attempted to turn Brady into a right to an "informed" guilty plea.
12
The Supreme Court properly found Brady ill suited to that task. As a
rule that protects against misinformed guilty pleas, Brady is at best a
"random"1 3 kind of protection. It can inform some defendants, but
leave others largely in the dark. And the difference has little to do
with the potential for innocence. 14  As a practical matter, a
nonwaivable Brady rule can prohibit agreements that are desirable to
defendants and that promote other important public interests like the
safety of witnesses or the candor of testimony from cooperating
accomplices. 15 The Ninth Circuit's nonwaivable Brady rule would
8 Indeed, those are the same defendants most likely to have given false confessions of
guilt during investigation of the crime. See Paul T. Hourihan, Earl Washington's Confession:
Mental Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REv. 1471, 1493 (1995) (noting that
the risk of a false confession compounds the risk of a false guilty plea).
9 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
10 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
11 United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Wright,
43 F.3d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1994); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 422-23 (8th Cir.
1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1319 (2d Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d
314, 321-23 (6th Cir. 1988).
12 United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Sanchez v. United
States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995)). Under that approach, undisclosed exculpatory
evidence is "material," and therefore sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea, if disclosure would
have changed defendant's mind about pleading guilty. Id. at 1166 ("Evidence is 'material' if
'there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the
defendant would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial."') (quoting Sanchez, 50
F.3d at 1454)).
13 "Random" is the Court's word. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002).
14 Indeed, as I have suggested elsewhere, the Ninth Circuit's version of Brady may offer
the least protection to innocent defendants who are most vulnerable to coercion in plea
bargaining. Douglass, Fatal Attraction, supra note 5, at 499-503. It can even create perverse
incentives for prosecutors to disclose less information during plea bargaining. Id. at 493-98.
15 See infra text at notes 33-36.
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have undermined longstanding discovery rules designed with those
interests in mind.
While I agree with the outcome in Ruiz, I believe there still may be
a role for Brady when defendant challenges a guilty plea: a role not
foreclosed by the Court's ruling in Ruiz, and one more closely aligned
with the role Brady plays after a guilty verdict at trial. After trial a
Brady challenge focuses on outcomes. It is a kind of safety net for
innocence. In a post-trial Brady challenge, we ask whether previously
undisclosed information would "undermine confidence in the
verdict."' 16 We should ask the same question when we apply Brady to
a guilty plea. The question is not whether defendant made a well
informed choice to plead guilty. The question should be whether
undisclosed exculpatory evidence undermines confidence in the
judgment of guilt entered as a result of that guilty plea. In other
words, we should ask whether the evidence raises a reasonable
probability that an innocent person has pleaded guilty.
This standard of "materiality" is more doctrinally consistent with
Brady itself. And, unlike the Ninth Circuit's approach, this standard
offers its broadest protection to the most vulnerable defendants.
Further, this standard of materiality directs the court to consider not
just the "random" assortment of information that may have influenced
the defendant's choice to plead guilty, but all information that reflects
on guilt or innocence, including the defendant's own statements in
court at the time of the plea. This approach focuses not on defendant's
decision making, but on his potential innocence. After all, that is the
main reason for joining Brady and plea bargaining in the first place.
I. THE FAILED MARRIAGE OF BRADY AND PLEA BARGAINING
A. Adapting Brady to Plea Bargains: How the Ninth Circuit and
Other Courts Constructed a Nonwaivable Right to an Informed Plea
It should matter that a defendant stands in open court, represented
by counsel, and confesses his guilt in the form of a guilty plea. In the
eyes of the Supreme Court, it does matter-a lot. For one thing, by
pleading guilty defendant waives not only the right to trial but also
the right to challenge constitutional violations that may have preceded
the plea. 17 After "a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open
court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged,
he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the
16 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
17 Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
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deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of
the guilty plea.'
8
Any theory that allows a defendant to raise a Brady challenge in
the wake of a guilty plea must first surmount the considerable hurdle
of the plea itself and the waiver that goes along with it. A number of
courts, 19 including the Ninth Circuit,20 constructed a theory to
accomplish that. To do so, they borrowed from-or perhaps
stretched-two doctrines recognized by the Supreme Court. The first
is that a guilty plea is valid only if it is "voluntary and intelligent.",
21
A plea entered in ignorance of substantial undisclosed exculpatory
evidence, those courts held, is not an "intelligent" plea and, hence, not
a valid waiver of rights.22 Second, borrowing from cases dealing with
ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilty plea process, 23 those
courts have found that Brady evidence is "material" to a guilty plea if
there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have caused
defendant to reject the plea bargain and choose trial.24 The result is a
Brady-based doctrine tied to defendant's decision making. He has a
right to withdraw a plea where his decision to plead guilty would
have been different but for the prosecutor's nondisclosure of Brady
evidence. This, in essence, is what the Ninth Circuit and other courts
did in the series of opinions that led to Ruiz.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit went one step further. It held in Ruiz that
the disclosure rule cannot be waived, even by explicit terms in the
plea agreement.25 Such a waiver, the court found, could not be
voluntary and intelligent if entered in ignorance of Brady material. In
effect, defendant would not know what he was waiving.26 The end
result for the Ninth Circuit in Ruiz was a nonwaivable right of the
defendant to be informed of Brady evidence when he decides whether
to accept a plea bargain.
Is Id,
19 United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Wright,
43 F.3d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1994); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 422-23 (8th Cir.
1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1319 (2d Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d
314, 321-23 (6th Cir. 1988).
20 Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995).
21 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
242 (1969).
22 Ruiz v. United States, 241 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sanchez, 50 F.3d at
1453); White, 858 F.2d at 422-23); Miller, 848 F.at 1319; Campbell, 769 F.2d at 321-23.
23 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (permitting withdrawal of a plea where "there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial").
24 E.g., Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454; Miller, 848 F.2d at 1321-22.
25 Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1165.
26 Id.
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B. Why Ruiz Was a Weak "Test Case "for Extending Brady to Plea
Bargaining
If the Department of Justice had concerns as lower courts began to
extend Brady into the world of plea bargaining, then folks in the
Solicitor General's Office must have rejoiced when Ruiz materialized
as the "test case" in the Supreme Court. It is hard to imagine facts
more favorable to the government. First, unlike most Brady cases,
Ruiz was not litigated under a cloud of government misconduct. There
was no indication that the government actually withheld anything
exculpatory. Second, there was no suggestion of innocence. Ruiz had
been caught red-handed with thirty kilograms of marijuana in her
luggage. 2 Finally, Ruiz pled guilty and never tried to withdraw her
plea. She sought only the benefits of the more favorable plea offer she
had rejected earlier because it contained a limited waiver of Brady
rights.
28
The issue framed by these facts likewise was highly favorable to
the government, for two reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit rule was
nonwaivable.29 In effect, it was an inflexible constitutional mandate
that no plea could be entered until the government had completed a
search for Brady material and disclosed it all to defendant, even if the
parties wanted to go forward with the plea at an earlier stage. In a
world where early guilty pleas based on limited information have
become routine,30 often because they are favorable to a defendant,31
that kind of rule posed serious practical concerns.32
27 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002).
28 Id. at 626.
29 Id.
30 Indeed, the plea agreement rejected by Ruiz came before indictment and was part of a
"fast track" program designed to handle routine drug importation cases which arise in large
numbers from Mexican border crossings in the Southern District of California. Ruiz, 241 F.3d at
1160-61 (citing United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).
31 See Fatal Attraction, supra note 5, at 505-06.
32 No doubt, as Professor McMunigal points out, the Supreme Court overstated those
concerns when it suggested that the Ninth Circuit rule "could lead the Government . . . to
abandon its heavy reliance upon plea bargaining ... " Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 632. Still, as the facts of
Ruiz suggest, an inflexible rule would add costs and delays to the disposition of many routine
cases.
One concern which neither the parties nor the Court addressed in Ruiz is a problem that
arises in the many cases where a plea bargain is aimed at securing defendant's testimony as a
cooperating government witness. Concerns over the credibility of cooperating witnesses are
well documented. See Stephen Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as
Witnesses, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1381 (1996). If Brady required prosecutors to disclose all
favorable evidence while negotiating a plea and cooperation agreement, such disclosures might
influence cooperating defendants to "tailor" their stories to fit those disclosures in an effort to
curry favor with the prosecutor. In those cases, by giving Brady disclosure to one defendant, a
prosecutor unwittingly might encourage false testimony against a different defendant. See Fatal
Attraction, supra note 5, at 506 n. 296.
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Second, the "Brady waiver" proposed by the government in Ruiz
was limited. The government agreed to disclose any information
"establishing the [defendant's] factual innocence. 33 The waiver
covered only "impeachment information" relating to government
witnesses or informants, and information supporting affirmative
defenses. 34 By requiring disclosure of impeachment evidence in
advance of any guilty plea, the Ninth Circuit touched an especially
sensitive government nerve: concern over witness safety and
protection of informants in ongoing investigations. The Ninth Circuit
rule conflicted with limitations on witness-related discovery in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure3 5 and the Jencks Act.36 In effect,
the Ninth Circuit rule would have given broader discovery rights to a
defendant who sought an early plea bargain than to one who was
preparing for trial.3 7 As a result, even before the Court addressed the
doctrinal basis for the Ninth Circuit's rule of informed choice in plea
bargaining, the rule had two strikes against it.
C. Why Brady Fails as a Right to an "Informed" Plea Bargain
At trial, the government puts its inculpatory case before the jury in
order to get a conviction. Brady insures that the jury gets the rest of
the story, at least insofar as it consists of important exculpatory
evidence. Sometimes, Brady can work the same way in plea
negotiations. Where the prosecutor shows only her most favorable
33 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.
34 Id.
35 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) (exempting prosecution witness statements from pretrial
discovery).
36 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000). Given the longevity of the Jencks Act in a world where
legislators recognize that the vast majority of cases are resolved through plea bargaining, one
might argue that the Act reflects a legislative endorsement of the notion that prosecutors are free
to negotiate guilty pleas while disclosing little or nothing about government witnesses.
37 In many state courts, discovery rules allow the prosecution to avoid disclosing even the
names of prosecution witnesses before trial. See Cary Clermon, Pre-Trial Discovery of Witness
Lists: A Modest Proposal to Improve the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 641, 659 (1989) (noting that about half
of the states require pretrial disclosure of witness identity). In federal prosecutions, only
defendants facing the death penalty are entitled to a list of government witnesses before trial.
See generally18 U.S.C. § 3432. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2)
protect a witness's prior statements from disclosure until the witness actually testifies at trial.
It is true, as Professor McMunigal argues, that most prosecutors in most cases choose
voluntarily to make earlier disclosure of witness-related information than the rules require.
Hence, disclosure of impeaching information would pose little burden on the government and
raise few concerns about witness intimidation in most cases. But the Ninth Circuit's
nonwaivable constitutional mandate would apply to every case, including those where early
identification of government witnesses could risk lives and shut down ongoing investigations. In
rejecting that inflexible rule, the Supreme Court recognized the need for "careful tailoring" of
rules requiring disclosure relating to witnesses. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 632. Once again, the breadth of
the Ninth Circuit rule made Ruiz an easier case for the government.
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cards, Brady disclosure can offer a more realistic view of the strength
of the government's case, allowing defendant to make a more frilly
informed choice to plead guilty or go to trial. That seems to be the
model that the Ninth Circuit had in mind. And it may be an accurate
model for many cases.
38
But whether Brady works that way for a given defendant is largely
a matter of chance. Brady disclosure is more, or less, valuable to a
given defendant depending upon what else he knows about the
government's case when he chooses to accept a plea bargain.39
Weaknesses in an eye-witness's identification, for example, may tell a
defendant little about the strength of the government's case until he
knows how many other eye witnesses there may be. The uncertain
benefit of Brady disclosure is readily apparent in the case of
impeachment evidence, the kind that was at issue in Ruiz. Impeaching
evidence means little to the defendant who does not know the
inculpatory story that the witness will tell. Almost certainly it will
mean less to that defendant than to others who know the rest of the
story. And there is no constitutional principle that requires the
government to disclose the rest of the story.4°
Brady applies only to information "favorable" to the defense.41 It
says nothing about unfavorable evidence. Under the best of
circumstances, Brady provides only a piece of the information
relevant to a defendant's choice to accept or reject a plea bargain. As
a rule protecting defendant's right to an informed guilty plea, then,
Brady is a mismatch from the start. The Ruiz Court said as much
when it noted the "random" way in which Brady disclosure "may, or
may not, help a particular defendant.
' 2
II. BRADY AS A RULE OF INNOCENCE
Ruiz leaves little room to argue that Brady protects "informed
choice" in plea bargaining. Nevertheless, we may find a role for
Brady if we shift our focus, ever so slightly, from the defendant's
choice to the defendant's potential innocence. The question is not
38 In many cases the prospect of inducing a plea gives prosecutors an incentive to offer
more informal discovery than the rules require. See Fatal Attraction, supra note 5, at 457-58;
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' OFFICE MANUAL §9-6.200 (Sept. 1997)
(encouraging prosecutors to consider informal pretrial disclosure to "enhance the prospects that
the defendant will plead guilty").
39 See generally Fatal Attraction, supra note 5, at 491-92.
40 There is no constitutional rule that would require prosecutors to disclose that witness's
statements inculpating defendant. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) ("There
is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case . .
41 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
42 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630.
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whether defendant made an informed choice to plead guilty. The
question is whether undisclosed Brady evidence undermines our
confidence in the adjudication of guilt that is based on that plea.
Viewed in that light, Brady may play the same role after a guilty plea
that it plays after a guilty verdict.
A. Brady After a Guilty Verdict: A Limited Rule Tied to Outcome
at Trial
In the context of trial Brady v. Maryland requires a prosecutor to
disclose evidence that is "favorable" to the defense and "material" to
guilt or punishment.43 Though Brady initially was welcomed as a
broad rule of pretrial discovery, the Court's views on "materiality"
have left Brady with a more limited function. The Court has limited
Brady's reach in large measure because of the way we enforce the
rule. The central problem is one of "bad timing." 44 Brady is a
prospective rule, enforced only in retrospect. Brady requires
disclosure at or before trial. But it is routinely enforced only after a
guilty verdict, when previously undisclosed evidence comes to light.
At that point, judicial efforts to enforce Brady conflict with judicial
interests in preserving the finality of a jury's verdict. Reluctance to
overturn a verdict leads to a limited view of the government's
disclosure obligation.
As a result, the Court has set a high bar for "materiality." And the
test for materiality is tied directly to the result which defendant seeks
to unravel. Hence, the Court has told us, favorable evidence is
"material" only if "there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. '45 A "reasonable probability," the Court explains, "is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
' 46
B. Brady After a Guilty Plea: Seeking Confidence in the Judgment
of Guilt
After a trial, Brady focuses on results. When exculpatory
information in government hands comes to light after the verdict, we
ask whether the information "undermine[s] confidence in the
outcome." After a guilty plea, Brady should lead us to ask the same
question. Does the previously undisclosed information undermine
43 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (1963).
44 See Fatal Attraction, supra note 5, at 443 (discussing Brady's "bad timing" as a
"prospective rule, enforced only retrospectively").
45 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
46 Id.
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confidence in the outcome? And the "outcome" is a judgment of guilt
entered pursuant to that guilty plea. Stated differently, a post-plea
Brady disclosure should overcome a judgment of guilt where the
undisclosed favorable evidence, viewed in conjunction with the plea
itself and with defendant's factual admissions in connection with the
plea, give rise to a reasonable probability that defendant is innocent.
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, this approach accords Brady
essentially the same function after a plea that it plays after a trial. In
both contexts Brady functions as a kind of safety net for innocence. It
gives courts an opportunity to scrutinize the judgment of guilt-
whether it follows a trial or a plea-to determine whether
nondisclosure has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
But unlike the Ninth Circuit's doctrine in Ruiz, which focuses on
defendant's tactical decision making leading up to a guilty plea, 7 this
approach gives substantial weight to the guilty plea itself in deciding
whether to set aside an otherwise final judgment of guilt. It allows
courts to recognize a guilty plea for what it is in most cases: a reliable
statement of factual guilt. In this respect, I suggest, this approach is as
consistent as one can be with the Court's somewhat inconsistent
decisions on the finality of guilty pleas.48 In effect, it clothes a
voluntary guilty plea with a strong, but not conclusive, presumption
of finality.
Still, as Professor McMunigal has pointed out, there are more than
a few circumstances that should lead us to question the accuracy or
sincerity of a guilty plea. Those include cases where the elements of
factual guilt may not be fully within a defendant's knowledge, or
cases where youth or mental disability affect defendant's
47 The Ninth Circuit's doctrine of "informed choice" was unrelated to innocence. It
allowed a defendant to take back a guilty plea if he was misinformed as a result of government
disclosure, no matter how accurate and sincere his in-court admission of guilt may have been.
Indeed, the most likely application of the Ruiz rule in most cases would have been to allow
renegotiation of more favorable plea bargains by guilty defendants. See Fatal Attraction, supra
note 5, at 489 n.224.
48 The oft-quoted dictum in Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), suggests the Court
views guilty pleas as conclusive evidence of factual guilt: "a counseled plea of guilty is an
admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly
removes the issue of factual guilt from the case." Id. at 63 n.2. But statements in the Court's
more fully developed guilty-plea opinions are more circumspect: "This mode of conviction
[through guilty plea] is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury. Accordingly,
we take great precautions against unsound results, and we should continue to do so, whether
conviction is by plea or by trial." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). Indeed, the
Court in Brady v. United States went on to say that its confidence in the factual accuracy of
guilty pleas "is based on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves ... that there is
nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of the defendant's admissions that they
committed the crimes with which they are charged." Id. My suggested approach would not
accord guilty pleas the absolute factual finality suggested by the dictum in Menna. But it is
thoroughly consistent with the more measured language of Brady v. United States.
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understanding of his own guilt.49 They also include cases where the
pressure of a too-good-to-be-true plea bargain could lead a defendant
to plead guilty despite his factual innocence. An approach which asks
a court to consider the probability of innocence in spite of the guilty
plea, invites the court to consider all of these factors which might
affect the sincerity or accuracy of the plea. In the absence of such
factors, only the most powerfully exculpatory Brady disclosure would
lead a court to overturn a final judgmenti 0 But where such factors are
present and undermine our confidence in the in-court confession of
guilt, the post-plea Brady calculus may well be, and should be, more
generous to the defendant. An approach focused on defendant's
potential innocence would allow such factors to weigh in defendant's
favor, thus granting the most protection in cases where false guilty
pleas are most likely. By contrast, under the Ruiz doctrine of
"informed choice," such factors were at best irrelevant,51 and at worst
tended to work against the defendant.
52
Finally, a post-plea Brady approach focused on factual innocence
may encourage courts to demand a more fully-developed factual
record at the time of the plea itself.53 Indeed, an increased insistence
by courts on factual development at the guilty-plea stage would itself
encourage increased disclosure-of both inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence-during plea bargaining.
54
49 See McMunigal, supra note 2, at 971-82.
50 This approach is consistent with outcomes in those courts which have applied the Brady
doctrine in reviewing guilty pleas. Even where courts consider post-plea Brady claims on the
merits, few cases result in findings favorable to defendants. Most find that the undisclosed
evidence was not "material" to the plea decision. See Fatal Attraction, supra note 5, at 479 n.
184 (citing numerous cases where courts have found evidence not "material," compared to only
a few reaching an opposite result).
51 The Ninth Circuit standard at issue in Ruiz purported to be an "objective standard,"
Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454, which presumably would not take into account personal
characteristics of a given defendant.
52 By focusing on defendant's decision making-i.e., whether the disclosed Brady
evidence would have caused defendant to reject a plea agreement and go to trial--the Ruiz
standard made the benefit of the plea bargain itself a relevant factor. Presumably, the sweeter
the bargain, the more likely a defendant would accept the offer even with knowledge that the
government's case was weak. Hence, the Ruiz approach gave the least protection where
defendants were tempted by the most generous bargains: exactly the cases where we are most
likely to see innocent defendants coerced into guilty pleas. See Fatal Attraction, supra note 5, at
500.
53 A more detailed account of the prosecutor's evidence, and a defendant's more detailed
account of his own participation in the offense, would provide a substantial record to assist a
court that was later faced with a motion to withdraw a plea on Brady grounds.
54 To satisfy a court concerned with avoiding later challenges to a guilty plea, prosecutors
would have an incentive to detail their inculpatory case at the time of the plea. As for
exculpatory evidence, even those prosecutors who might be tempted to "bluff' defense counsel
during bargaining would be far less sanguine about bluffing a court at the plea proceeding.
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I1. CONCLUSION: BRADY'S SYMBOLIC VALUE
Despite the Court's narrow definition of "materiality," Brady's
symbolic power in the pretrial context remains stronger than its
corrective power in the world of post-trial motions. Most prosecutors
want to avoid Brady problems altogether. "No criminal conviction,"
they are taught, "is worth your own integrity, not to mention your
license to practice law." As a result, most prosecutors disclose more
"Brady material" in the process of pretrial discovery than the
constitutional rule actually demands.55 And that is a good thing in a
world where limited discovery rules often handicap the opportunity
for an effective defense. Indeed, Brady's greatest value may be
symbolic. It stands as a constitutional reminder to prosecutors that
they cannot serve as architects of unfairness.56 Most of them take that
obligation very seriously. In the context of plea bargaining, Brady's
symbolic power likewise may be its greatest virtue. For that reason
alone we should be cautious not to stretch the Supreme Court's
opinion in Ruiz into a doctrine that excludes Brady from the plea-
bargaining world altogether. To the extent that we concede as a
constitutional principle that prosecutors can bluff, we risk promoting
as an ethical principle that they should.
55 See Fatal Attraction, supra note 5, at 458-60.
56 Brady itself drives home the point:
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when an
accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department
of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: 'The
United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the
courts.' A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused
which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the
penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts
the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not
comport with standards ofjustice ....
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.
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